Showing posts with label payload. Show all posts
Showing posts with label payload. Show all posts

Saturday, April 29, 2017

Malware Uses Apple Developer Certificate to Infect MacOS and Spy on HTTPS Traffic

from macrumors.com

A malware research team has discovered a new piece of Mac malware that reportedly affects all versions of MacOS and is signed with a valid developer certificate authenticated by Apple (via The Hacker News). 

The malware has been dubbed "DOK" and is being disseminated through an email phishing campaign which researchers at CheckPoint say is specifically targeting macOS users, making it the first of its kind. 

The malware works by gaining administration privileges in order to install a new root certificate on the user's system. This enables it to gain access to all communications between the host Mac and the internet, including traffic flowing through connections encrypted with SSL. 

The initial email pretends to be informing the recipient of inconsistencies in their tax return and asks them to download a zip file attachment to their Mac that harbors the malware. Apple's built-in Gatekeeper security feature reportedly fails to recognize it as a threat because of its valid developer certificate, and the malware copies itself to the /Users/Shared/ folder and creates a login item to make itself persistent, even in a rebooted system. 

The malware later presents the user with a security message claiming an update is available for the system, for which a password input is required. Following the "update", the malware gains complete control of admin privileges, adjusts the network settings to divert all outgoing connections through a proxy, and installs additional tools that enable it to perform a man-in-the-middle attack on all traffic. 


According to the researchers, Mac antivirus programs have yet to update their databases to detect the DOK malware, and advises that Apple revoke the developer certificate associated with the author immediately. 

Back in January, researchers discovered a piece of Mac malware called Fruitfly that successfully spied on computers in medical research centers for years before being detected. 

The latest discovery of malware, which appears to target predominantly European users, underlines the fact that Macs are not immune to the threat as is sometimes supposed. As always, users should avoid clicking links or downloading attachments in emails from unknown and untrusted sources.

Wednesday, January 20, 2016

Apple Gatekeeper still lets malware in

from komando.com
If you use a Mac, you may be comforted by its reputation for being secure. For decades, Apple had done a great job of keeper hackers out.

That is, until Apple products started becoming really popular in recent years. Then, hackers began to pounce. Now, Macs are often hit by hackers, or found to be vulnerable to attack.

That's the case with Apple Gatekeeper. Ironically, it's a program that's meant to keep the bad guys out. If you download apps, you can tell Apple to only let in apps from trusted providers.

As Apple puts it, Gatekeeper helps "protect your Mac from malware and misbehaving apps downloaded from the Internet." Apple says it screens all the apps on Mac App Store, and those created by developers with an Apple Developer ID.

Apple goes on to say: "If an app was developed by an unknown developer, one with no Developer ID, or tampered with, Gatekeeper can block the app from being installed." (See photo.)

The problem is cybersecurity experts last year found there's a flaw with Gatekeeper. The flaw, CVE-2015-7024, lets hackers get in. Once in, they can use malware to steal your personal information, take over your Mac and demand ransom, spy on you, and more.

Last year, this same cybersecurity expert alerted Apple about the flaw in Gatekeeper. Apple issued a patch to fix the problem.

However, as it turned out, Apple patched only some of the entryways for hackers to get in. The problem is, hackers can still get into Gatekeeper.

They can access a trusted app and load a .dmg file malware onto your Mac. It's vulnerable if you're not using the secure HTTPS protocol, or you're not accessing the app from the Mac App Store.

As of now, Apple is said to be working with cybersecurity experts to fully patch up the security flaw in Gatekeeper.

While Apple and cybersecurity experts work on fixing this vulnerability, you should make sure you're protecting yourself, your financial information, and your digital devices. You should use a suite of strong security tools, including an anti-virus program. We recommend our sponsor, Kaspersky Lab.

Thursday, November 5, 2015

Mac OS X Malware Soars in 2015

from infosecurity-magazine.com/
Mac malware is set to accelerate over the coming months after having its most prolific year ever so far in 2015, according to new research from endpoint security firm Bit9 + Carbon Black.
After an analysis of the year so far, the vendor concluded that five times more Mac malware appeared in 2015 than the previous five years combined.   
It collected 1,400 unique samples over the period using custom built sandboxes and tools such as such as fs_usage, dtrace, and opensnoop.
It found that Mac malware as a whole does not borrow very heavily from Unix or Linux malware, which was unexpected given OS X’s roots in the open source FreeBSD.
Another interesting find was that more than 90% of the Mac malware it discovered still uses the old load command (LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD) to define the entry point into the Mach-O format.
This makes it easier to spot potential malware—if a new system is still using the old command.
In addition, the Bit9 + Carbon Black researchers concluded that the vast majority of Mac malware uses one of just seven persistence techniques to remain on an infected system.
These include LaunchAgents; LaunchDaemons; Login items; Browser plugins; StartupItems; Binary infection; and Cron job.
It appears the growing prevalence of Mac malware is unsurprisingly linked to a rising market share among consumers and enterprises.
“For years, Mac users have watched their PC-using counterparts struggle with cyber-attacks, while enjoying the relative immunity that their hardware provides from malware. This view is becoming increasingly outdated; our research shows that Mac users should be just as worried,” argued Bit9 + Carbon Black Emea MD, David Flower.
“With 45 per cent of businesses now offering Macs as an option to staff, our research should be seen as a timely reminder that every device on the network is a potential target—businesses can’t just rely on a clearly outdated perception of invulnerability.”

Monday, February 23, 2015

Most vulnerable operating systems and applications in 2014

from gfi.com

An average of 19 vulnerabilities per day were reported in 2014, according to the data from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The NVD provides a comprehensive list of software security vulnerabilities. In this article, I look at some of the trends and key findings for 2014 based on the NVD’s database.

Some of the questions asked are:

-       What are the latest vulnerability trends? Are we seeing an increase or a decrease in the number of vulnerabilities?

-       What percentage of these vulnerabilities are rated as critical? (e.g. high security impact – like allowing remote code execution – and thus easy to exploit)

-       In which areas do we see the most vulnerabilities? Are operating systems, third-party applications or network devices such as routers, switches, access points or printers most at risk?

-       Which operating systems and applications are listed with most vulnerabilities? This data is important because the products which are on top get the most frequent security updates. To maintain an IT infrastructure secure, sysadmins need to continually monitor these operating systems and applications for the latest updates and ensure they are always fully patched.

7,038 new security vulnerabilities were added to the NVD database in 2014. This means an average of 19 new vulnerabilities per day. The number is significantly higher than in 2013 and continues the ascending trend over the past few years.

24% of these vulnerabilities are rated as high severity. The percentage is lower than in 2013, but the actual number of high security vulnerabilities has increased compared to last year.
Third-party applications are the most important source of vulnerabilities with over 80% of the reported vulnerabilities in third-party applications. Operating systems are only responsible for 13% of vulnerabilities and hardware devices for 4%.

It is interesting that although Microsoft operating systems still have a considerable number of vulnerabilities, they are no longer in the top 3. Apple with OS X and iOS is at the top, followed by Linux kernel.

2014 was a tough year for Linux users from a security point of view, coupled with the fact that some of the most important security issues of the year were reported for applications that usually run on Linux systems. Heartbleed, for example, is a critical security vulnerability detected in OpenSSL while Shellshock is a vulnerability that affects GNU Bash.

The applications listed here are pretty much the same as in 2013. Not surprisingly at all, web browsers continue to have the most security vulnerabilities because they are a popular gateway to access a server and to spread malware on the clients. Adobe free products and Java are the main challengers but web browsers have continuously topped the table for the last six years. Mozilla Firefox had the most vulnerabilities reported in 2009 and 2012; Google Chrome in 2010 and 2011; Internet Explorer was at the top for the last two years.

To keep systems secure, it is critical that they are fully patched. IT admins should focus on (patch them first):

Wednesday, January 7, 2015

World’s first (known) bootkit for OS X can permanently backdoor Macs

from arstechnica.com
Securing Macs against stealthy malware infections could get more complicated thanks to a new proof-of-concept exploit that allows attackers with brief physical access to covertly replace the firmware of most machines built since 2011.

Once installed, the bootkit—that is, malware that replaces the firmware that is normally used to boot Macs—can control the system from the very first instruction. That allows the malware to bypass firmware passwords, passwords users enter to decrypt hard drives and to preinstall backdoors in the operating system before it starts running. Because it's independent of the operating system and hard drive, it will survive both reformatting and OS reinstallation. And since it replaces the digital signature Apple uses to ensure only authorized firmware runs on Macs, there are few viable ways to disinfect infected boot systems. The proof-of-concept is the first of its kind on the OS X platform. While there are no known instances of bootkits for OS X in the wild, there is currently no way to detect them, either.

The malware has been dubbed Thunderstrike, because it spreads through maliciously modified peripheral devices that connect to a Mac's Thunderbolt interface. When plugged into a Mac that's in the process of booting up, the device injects what's known as an Option ROM into the extensible firmware interface (EFI), the firmware responsible for starting a Mac's system management mode and enabling other low-level functions before loading the OS. The Option ROM replaces the RSA encryption key Macs use to ensure only authorized firmware is installed. From there, the Thunderbolt device can install malicious firmware that can't easily be removed by anyone who doesn't have the new key.

Enter evil maid

While the hack requires an attacker to have brief physical access to a targeted machine, that prerequisite isn't prohibitively steep in many situations. For example, so-called "evil maid" scenarios—in which a rogue hotel housekeeper tampers with a computer—or an agent at an international border crossing both routinely have access to computers, often while unsupervised. Documents leaked by former National Security Agency subcontractor Edward Snowden also exposed how agents intercept hardware being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance and covertly install modified firmware onto them before they’re delivered.

All any of these attackers would need to do to carry out a Thunderstrike-style attack is to reboot a Mac with a previously weaponized Thunderbolt device attached. If the machine is turned on but locked, the attacker need only press the power button for a few seconds to hard-reboot the machine. Firmware passwords, disk encryption passwords, and user passwords won't thwart the attack since the Option ROMs are loaded before any of those protections are checked.

Thunderstrike made its debut in late December, at the Chaos Communication Congress. The vulnerability was discovered by Trammell Hudson, an employee of a high-tech hedge fund in New York City called Two Sigma Investments, while trying to secure the firm's MacBooks. A self-described reverse engineering hobbyist, Hudson was previously known for creating Magic Lantern, an open source programming environment for Canon digital SLR cameras.

Thunderstrike builds on a similar attack as demonstrated at the 2012 Blackhat conference that bypasses OS X FileVault protections to install a rootkit. Like Thunderstrike, the 2012 exploit used Thunderbolt ports to inject the malicious payload into the boot process, but the earlier attack wasn't able to modify the boot ROM itself. To work around that limitation, the researcher—who works under the hacking moniker snare—wrote the bootkit to the EFI system partition.

Eureka

One of the breakthroughs of Thunderstrike is its ability to get the boot ROM firmware volumes validated. Hudson figured out how to do this after discovering an undocumented CRC32 cyclic redundancy check routine carried out during the normal validation process. A second breakthrough involved the discovery that Option ROMs are loaded during a recovery mode boot. That allowed Hudson to figure out how to replace Apple's existing EFI code.

Thunderstrike was just one of at least two EFI-based attacks that were demonstrated at December's Chaos Communication Congress. A separate talk delved into the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface, a similar mechanism that's used to boot some Windows and Linux machines. Hudson said an attack technique known as Dark Jedi that was outlined during the talk could possibly be adapted to make his exploit work remotely, so the attacker wouldn't require physical access. Earlier this week, the US CERT issued three advisories warning of vulnerabilities in widely used UEFI chips. A researcher from security firm Bromium also has this brief writeup on the UEFI talk.

Hudson said Apple is in the process of partially patching the vulnerabilities that make Thunderstrike possible. The remedy involves not allowing Option ROMs to load during firmware updates, a measure that Hudson said is effective against his current proof of concept. Apple already has begun rolling out the upgrade to Mac Mini's and iMac Retina 5ks and plans to make it more widely available soon.

"However... it is not a complete fix," he warned in a blog post detailing Thunderstrike. "Option ROMs are still loaded on normal boots, allowing snare's 2012 attack to continue working. Older Macs are subject to downgrade attacks by 'updating' to a vulnerable firmware version."

Until there's a complete fix from Apple, there aren't a lot of viable options for preventing Thunderstrike-type attacks. Pouring a liberal amount of epoxy glue in a Thunderbolt port will certainly make the exploit harder, since it would force an attacker to take apart the casing to access the underlying flash ROM chip, but it would come at the cost of disabling key functionality. The other obvious solution is for people to keep their machines on their person at all times, but that isn't always practical, either. Hotel safes and locked and sealed storage boxes are also only partially effective, since both measures are vulnerable to cracking and picking.

Friday, January 24, 2014

New OSX/Crisis Variant Invokes Pope Francis

from intego.com
A new sample of OSX/Crisis, the too popular Da Vinci rootkit from Hacking Team, reached our Malware Lab during the weekend. We currently do not have information about the origin of the file on VirusTotal, named “Frantisek,” but it is an Eastern European first name meaning Francis. Could it be related to Pope Francis?

Like the previous variants, OSX/Crisis.C is delivered through a dropper that installs silently, without requiring a password, and works on Mac OS X 10.5, 10.6, and 10.7. However, Hacking Team has updated some of the dropper code and the backdoor configuration file format.

The dropper executes an unusual segment: __INITSTUB. The original entry point EIP points to this code segment before reaching the almost empty _main function of the program. For this reason, an incautious researcher using a debugger could get infected without even noticing it. While it uses a different way to resolve system symbols, it crashes on OS X Mountain Lion or OS X Mavericks (segmentation fault). This might be a 64-bit bug in the malware.

When the dropper runs successfully, it hides the following files in the user’s home directory (in the Library/Preferences folder), inside a fake application bundle called OvzD7xFr.app:


  • 1 backdoor: 8oTHYMCj.XIl (32-bit)
  • 1 configuration file: ok20utla.3-B
  • 2 kernel extentions: Lft2iRjk.7qa (32-bit) and 3ZPYmgGV.TOA (64-bit)
  • 1 scripting addition: EDr5dvW8.p_w (FAT)
  • 1 XPC service: GARteYof._Fk (FAT)
  • 1 TIFF image, a System Preferences icon, ripped of Linkinus preferences panel: q45tyh
  • Then it executes the backdoor and finishes the installation by creating a LaunchAgent file, com.apple.mdworker.plist.


Similar to OSX/Crisis.B, this binary is obfuscated using MPress packer. It doesn’t run on OS X 10.9 as it is linked against the Apple System Profiler private framework, SPSupport, which is now 64-bit only; an “Image not found” exception is raised, and then it crashes. Furthermore, on a supported target, the backdoor simply uninstalls its files and quits. This could be related to a corrupted configuration file (the sample one starts with NULL bytes).

Other than a few new tricks, features implemented by the backdoor component are similar to previous variants: it patches the Activity Monitor application to hide itself, takes screenshots, captures audio and video, gathers user locations, connects to WiFi hotspots, syncs collected data with a Command and Control (C&C) server, and tricks the user using social engineering to gain System Administrator privileges and drop its rootkit.

At the time of this writing, the overhaul detection rate on VirusTotal is very low.

Intego VirusBarrier with up-to-date malware definitions protects Mac users against this malware, detected as OSX/Crisis.C.

Wednesday, January 22, 2014

Digitally signed data-stealing malware targets Mac users in "undelivered courier item" attack

from nakedsecurity.sophos.com
Our colleagues at SophosLabs pointed us at a interesting item of malware the other day, namely a data-stealing Trojan aimed at Mac users.
In fact, it was somewhat more than that: it was one of those "undelivered courier item" emails linking to a dodgy web server that guessed whether you were running Windows or OS X, and targeted you accordingly.
You're probably familiar with "undelivered item" scams.
The idea is surprisingly simple: you receive an email that claims to be a courier company that is having trouble delivering your article.
In the email is a link to, or an attachment containing, what purports to be a tracking note for the item.
You are invited to review the relevant document and respond so that delivery can be completed.
We've seen a wide variety of courier brands "borrowed" for this purpose, including DHL, the UK's Royal Mail and even, in one bewildering case, a made-up courier company called TNS24, with its very own website, featuring its very own amusingly ill-Photoshopped planes, ships and automobiles.
But a competently-executed courier scam can be fairly convincing, especially if the criminals behind it know enough about you to create what becomes atargeted attack.
Even a modest amount of detail (if that is not an oxymoron) can do the trick.
For example, the crooks will sound a lot more believable if they know your address and phone number; are aware of what you do in your job; and have a general idea about some of the projects you are working on right now.
Of course, if you open the attachment or click on the link in one of these scams, you are immediately put into harm's way: the attachment might try to trigger an exploit in your unpatched copy of Word, for instance, or the link might attack an unpatched Java plugin in your browser.
Here's what the emails looked like in this attack, with some details changed or redacted for safety:
We wish to inform you that we have a pending parcel for the past 10 days bearing your name Mr. Jonathan Sidebottom,with parcel number (MV-45-QA566). The parcel was sent for delivery on the below mentioned address but nobody was there to receive it. Your parcel content has a set of engineering documents, which was discovered during our security checks of parcels brought into our head office. So, we are sending you a scanned copy of that parcel. Give your positive response, if it belongs to you.
If you are a native speaker of English, you will notice that the wording of the email is clumsy and unidiomatic, and if you were to receive a message like this you might well be suspicious on those grounds alone.
But if Mr Sidebottom really is in the engineering business, and regularly deals with inbound documents from courier companies around the world, an email of this sort could easily pass muster.
The link, of course, doesn't really lead to fedex.com.ch, but instead takes you to a domain name that is controlled by the attackers.
If you are on a mobile device, the server delivers an error message.
If you are using a desktop browser that isn't Safari, you receive a ZIP file containing a Windows program detected by Sophos Anti-Virus asMal/VBCheMan-C, a vague relative of the Zbot or Zeus malware.
But if you are using Safari, you receive Mac malware, delivered as an Application bundle packaged inside a ZIP file.
By default, on OS X 10.9.1 (the latest update to Mavericks, Apple's most recent operating system version), Safari directly downloads the file, showing you an empty Safari window with the icon of the downloaded file in the Dock at the bottom of the screen:
Clicking on the download button shows you what looks like a PDF file:
There is no PDF file, as a visit to the Terminal windows quickly reveals.
Safari has automatically unzipped the download, producing an Application bundle (actually just a subdirectory tree with a special structure) that has deliberately been given a PDF icon:
As you can imagine, the temptation is to click on what looks like a PDF file to see what it contains.
OS X does try to advise you that you aren't opening a document, although you can argue that the warning would be more compelling if it explicitly said that you were about to "run a software program", rather than merely to "open" the file:
Note that you don't get a warning about the App being from an "unknown developer" because it is digitally signed, something that happens surprisingly often with modern malware.
→ The quantity of digitally-signed malware in circulation prompted Microsoft, which sees a lot more malware than Apple, to publish a recent blog post with the uncompromising title "Be a real security pro - Keep your private keys private." In that article, Microsoft documents a malware family it calls "Winwebsec" of which it has more than 15,000 digitally-signed samples, signed with 12 different stolen keys.
If you do click the [Open] button, nothing seems to happen: you end up back at the desktop with your email software open and an empty Safari window in front of it.
But a trip back to the Terminal shows that what looked like a PDF file is now running in the background as a process named foung:
As it happens, foung, like its counterpart delivered to Windows computers, is a bot, short for "robot malware", detected by Sophos Anti-Virus asOSX/LaoShu-A.
LaoShu-A as good as hands control of your Mac over to the attackers, but its primary functions appear to be more closely associated with data stealing than with co-opting you into a traditional money-making botnet.
(You will often hear the term RAT, or Remote Access Trojan, rather than the more common term bot, used to describe this sort of malware.)
In other words, the attackers seem more concerned with digging around on your computer for what they can steal than with abusing your computer and your internet connection to aid and abet other cybercriminal activities.
Amongst other things, LaoShu-A contains code to:
  • Search for files with extensions such as DOC, DOCX, XLS, XLSX, PPT and PPTX.
  • ZIP those files.
  • Upload (exfiltrate) them to a server operated by the attackers.
However, this RAT also knows how to:
  • Download new files.
  • Run arbitrary shell commands.
For example, during our tests, LaoShu-A downloaded a second application that took a screenshot with OS X's built-in screencapture command, and tried to exfiltrate the image it had just grabbed.
But the behaviour of that second application can be varied by the attackers at any time, which is why, in our recent podcast, Understanding botnets, SophosLabs expert James Wyke warned as follows:
Without analysing the full network capture of the entire interchange between a bot and the person controlling it, you can't say for sure exactly what that bot might have done... [it] might go and download some completely different piece of malware which carries out a completely different set of functionality.
James went on to recommend:
Be more suspicious of things you get in e-mail. E-mail is still one of the most common ways people get infected, and it is predominantly through social engineering attacks... So when you receive an e-mail from someone you've never heard of before, or you've never communicated with before, and there's some interesting attachment to the e-mail or [a link to click], ...don't do that! That's one of the that most common ways people get infected.
Let's hope this malware reminds OS X users of a few simple truths that some Mac fans still seem willing to ignore:
  • Mac malware is unusual, but not impossible.
  • Data thieves are interested in what Mac users have on their computers.
  • Malware writers can often get their hands on digital certificates to give software to give it a veneer of respectability and to bypass operating system warnings.
  • Mac malware doesn't have to ask for a password before running.
  • Mac malware can run directly from a download without an installation step.
  • Bots and RATs are particularly pernicious because they can update and adapt their behaviour after you are infected.
As always, prevention is better than cure.
And that "undelivered courier item" almost certainly doesn't exist.

Sunday, September 25, 2011

New Mac Trojan Found Disguised as PDF File

"Then, Lancelot, Galahad and I jump OUT of the rabbit..."

Summary: A newly discovered Mac vulnerability disguises itself as a PDF to trick users into opening it, which installs an Apache server on your Mac. Luckily it hasn’t been weaponized. Yet.


Just when you thought that it was safe to start using your Mac again comes a report that a new PDF vulnerability may be targeting Mac users.


Fellow ZDNet blogger Ryan Naraine brings the news via his Zero Day blog, that the malware, Trojan-Dropper:OSX/Revir.A “installs downloader component that downloads a backdoor program onto the system, while camouflaging its activity by opening a PDF file to distract the user.”


Lovely.


F-Secure notes that the vulnerability disguises itself as an Adobe Acrobat (PDF) file in an effort to trick users into opening it, which of course, triggers its payload. It even opens a bogus Chinese-language PDF in order to deceive the user and avoid detection. The payload, Backdoor:OSX/Imuler.A according to F-Secure, then runs in the background.


The good news, I suppose, is that Revir.A is fairly innocuous at this point. The payload is a bare Apache installation that is “not capable of communicating with the backdoor yet.” The going theory is that the author may have leaked it to see if any of the antivirus detectors picked it up. Luckily, someone did.


It’s important for Apple to act swiftly on this one. From the looks of things Revir.A probably wouldn’t be too hard to weaponize and we’re not sure how many people might already have the source code.


Apple: you’re on the clock.


MD5 hashes for the samples:


• Trojan-Dropper:OSX/Revir.A: fe4aefe0a416192a1a6916f8fc1ce484
• Trojan-Downloader:OSX/Revir.A: dfda0ddd62ac6089c6a35ed144ab528e
• Backdoor:OSX/Imuler.A: 22b1af87dc75a69804bcfe3f230d8c9d